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ABSTRACT	  Opportunity	  preceded	  choice	  and	  choice	  preceded	  rational	  choice	  in	  the	  development	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  theory.	  Rational	  choice	  was,	  thus,	  a	  
post	  hoc	  theoretical	  supplement	  to	  the	  initial	  realisation	  that	  immediate	  situations	  furnish	  key	  conditions	  affecting	  criminal	  behaviour	  and	  that	  these	  situations	  could	  be	  modified	  for	  preventive	  purposes.	  Rational	  choice	  seemed	  to	  suggest	  a	  general	  mechanism	  that	  could	  link	  the	  situation	  to	  the	  act.	  Change	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  rational	  choices	  about	  what	  to	  do	  will	  also	  change.	  The	  disposition	  to	  offend	  is	  not	  so	  strong	  that	  individuals’	  criminal	  behaviours	  are	  inexorable.	  Choice	  in	  general	  and	  rational	  choice	  in	  particular	  filled	  for	  a	  while	  a	  theoretical	  vacuum	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  influence	  situations	  evidently	  exert	  on	  behaviour	  and	  has	  been	  used	  to	  inform	  further	  research.	  It	  also	  provided	  a	  heuristic	  for	  practitioners	  to	  think	  about	  changes	  to	  the	  situation	  that	  might	  influence	  prospective	  offenders’	  decisions.	  Yet	  there	  is	  growing	  evidence	  that	  rational	  choice	  assumptions	  are	  implausible	  and	  unnecessary.	  They	  may	  now	  be	  inhibiting	  rather	  than	  facilitating	  progress	  in	  research	  and	  practice.	  Their	  weaknesses	  may	  also	  be	  detracting	  from	  the	  credibility	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  more	  generally,	  both	  in	  academic	  and	  practitioner	  circles.	  It	  is	  argued	  here	  that	  theory	  and	  practice	  would	  both	  be	  improved	  by	  abandoning	  rational	  choice	  as	  the	  sole	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  situational	  crime	  prevention.	  In	  its	  place,	  we	  outline	  ten	  tenets,	  which	  we	  argue	  more	  fully	  describe	  the	  role	  situations	  play	  in	  crime,	  and	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  accommodating	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  situational	  theories	  and	  perspectives.	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Thomas	  Kuhn	  (1962)	  and	  Imre	  Lakatos	  (1978)	  show	  that	  major	  scientific	  ideas	  rarely	  perish	  at	  a	  stroke.	  Despite	  Popper’s	  (1959)	  emphasis	  on	  falsification,	  theories	  can	  be	  readily	  and	  rationally	  preserved	  by	  ad	  hoc	  adaptations,	  and	  qualifications	  that	  effectively	  inoculate	  them	  from	  attack.	  Moreover,	  as	  even	  Popper	  himself	  conceded,	  this	  often	  makes	  good	  sense	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  science.	  Theories	  would	  perish	  before	  their	  potential	  was	  realised	  if	  they	  were	  jettisoned	  at	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  trouble.	  The	  full	  articulation	  of	  a	  theory	  takes	  time.	  Initial	  formulations	  can	  be	  crude.	  Moreover,	  even	  when	  a	  theory	  begins	  to	  fail	  –	  when	  ‘anomalies’	  as	  Kuhn	  describes	  them	  appear	  –	  in	  the	  natural	  sciences	  that	  has	  not	  marked	  the	  point	  at	  which	  confidence	  in	  existing	  paradigms	  is	  lost	  and	  something	  new	  sought.	  Lakatos	  refers	  to	  ‘progressive	  problem	  shifts’	  to	  describe	  adaptations	  to	  theories	  that	  are	  fruitful	  in	  that	  they	  produce	  new	  findings.	  He	  refers	  to	  ‘degenerating	  problem	  shifts’	  that	  preserve	  a	  theory	  but	  are	  not	  progressive	  and	  do	  not	  generate	  new	  findings.	  	  For	  Kuhn,	  the	  accumulation	  of	  anomalies	  leads	  eventually	  to	  a	  crisis	  of	  confidence	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  a	  new	  paradigm.	  Lakatos’	  formulation	  is	  less	  rooted	  in	  ‘mob	  psychology’	  and	  refers	  instead	  to	  a	  change	  of	  direction	  that	  makes	  sense	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  knowledge.	  	  We	  use	  a	  Kuhnian/Lakatosian	  framework	  as	  a	  way	  of	  interpreting	  the	  history	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  (SCP),	  the	  importation	  of	  the	  rational	  choice	  perspective	  (RCP)	  into	  it,	  criticisms	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  that	  focus	  on	  RCP,	  and	  responses	  to	  those	  criticisms.	  We	  argue	  that	  even	  if	  it	  was	  once	  helpful,	  RCP	  will	  no	  longer	  do	  as	  a	  fundamental	  underpinning	  of	  SCP	  and	  is	  now	  holding	  it	  back.	  We	  conclude	  with	  a	  new	  set	  of	  10	  tenets	  for	  SCP	  that	  no	  longer	  makes	  RCP	  central.	  Our	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  propose	  a	  new	  theory	  for	  SCP	  but	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rather	  to	  describe	  the	  role	  that	  situations	  play	  in	  behaviour	  in	  a	  way	  that	  accommodates	  multiple	  theoretical	  perspectives.	  This,	  we	  suggest,	  offers	  a	  fruitful	  way	  ahead	  both	  for	  research	  on	  crime	  and	  for	  policy	  and	  practice	  to	  address	  crime	  problems.	  	  	  	  
HOW	  RCP	  CAME	  TO	  BE	  ASSOCIATED	  WITH	  SCP	  While	  RCP	  and	  SCP	  have	  become	  closely	  linked,	  this	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  case.	  The	  ideas	  behind	  SCP	  began	  coalescing	  into	  coherent	  prevention	  models	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1970s.	  RCP	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  was	  first	  proposed	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  SCP	  some	  15	  years	  later.	  In	  other	  words,	  RCP	  was	  settled	  on	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  SCP	  practices	  that	  were	  already	  well	  established.	  	  It	  was	  intended	  to	  add	  theoretical	  coherence	  to	  SCP	  and	  to	  inform	  a	  research	  programme.	  It	  was	  seen,	  therefore,	  to	  comprise	  a	  progressive	  move.	  The	  first	  proto-­‐situational	  models	  of	  crime	  prevention	  were	  presented	  in	  two	  books,	  with	  strikingly	  similar	  titles,	  published	  within	  a	  year	  of	  each	  other.	  The	  first	  was	  C.	  Ray	  Jeffrey’s	  (1971)	  Crime	  Prevention	  Through	  Environmental	  
Design;	  the	  second	  was	  Oscar	  Newman’s	  (1972)	  Defensible	  Space:	  Crime	  
Prevention	  Through	  Urban	  Design.	  As	  their	  titles	  suggest	  both	  books	  proposed	  crime	  control	  strategies	  that	  involved	  manipulation	  of	  the	  immediate	  environment.	  Their	  approaches	  and	  underpinning	  assumptions,	  however,	  varied	  considerably.	  	  Jeffrey,	  a	  criminologist,	  built	  his	  situational	  analysis	  of	  crime	  around	  an	  operant	  conditioning	  model	  of	  behaviour.	  With	  this	  as	  his	  starting	  point,	  he	  proposed	  an	  eclectic	  assortment	  of	  interventions	  designed	  to	  alter	  the	  punishment	  and	  reward	  structures	  in	  criminogenic	  environments.	  His	  approach	  
	   6	  
shares	  some	  assumptions	  with	  RCP,	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  performance	  of	  crime	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  function	  of	  its	  consequences.	  Crime	  prevention,	  therefore,	  was	  seen	  to	  involve	  the	  manipulation	  of	  those	  consequences	  –	  behaviour	  that	  was	  rewarded	  would	  be	  repeated	  while	  behaviour	  that	  was	  punished	  would	  be	  discouraged.	  However,	  Jeffery’s	  was	  a	  Skinnerian,	  black-­‐box	  model	  of	  human	  behaviour.	  There	  was	  no	  place	  for	  cognition,	  much	  less	  rational	  decision	  making.	  It	  was	  also	  highly	  deterministic.	  ‘There	  are	  no	  criminals’	  Jeffrey	  declared,	  ‘only	  environmental	  circumstances	  that	  result	  in	  criminal	  behaviour.	  Given	  the	  proper	  environmental	  structure,	  anyone	  will	  be	  criminal	  or	  non-­‐criminal’	  (Jeffrey,	  1977,	  p.	  177).	  	  In	  contrast,	  Newman,	  an	  architect,	  barely	  mentioned	  offenders.	  The	  central	  construct	  in	  his	  approach	  was	  territoriality.	  Territoriality	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  lay	  claim	  to	  an	  area	  and	  defend	  it	  against	  intruders,	  and	  it	  is	  a	  quality	  possessed	  by	  territorial	  possessors	  not	  intruders.	  Thus,	  Newman’s	  focus	  was	  on	  changing	  the	  behaviour	  of	  non-­‐offenders	  –	  the	  potential	  victims	  and	  observers	  of	  crime.	  Operating	  at	  the	  urban	  design	  level,	  Newman’s	  interventions	  were	  formulated	  to	  instil	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  in	  residents.	  If	  residents	  took	  a	  greater	  proprietorial	  interest	  in	  their	  immediate	  environs,	  it	  was	  argued,	  then	  they	  would	  also	  exercise	  greater	  levels	  of	  care	  and	  surveillance	  over	  those	  areas.	  As	  for	  the	  psychological	  processes	  acting	  on	  potential	  offenders,	  implicit	  but	  never	  fully	  fleshed	  out	  was	  a	  rudimentary	  deterrence	  theory.	  Offenders	  need	  only	  possess	  the	  capacity	  to	  recognise	  territorial	  cues	  –	  boundary	  markers,	  changes	  in	  paving	  texture,	  signs	  of	  occupation,	  and	  the	  like	  –	  that	  signalled	  that	  an	  area	  was	  under	  the	  care	  and	  control	  of	  residents.	  With	  this	  realisation	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  they	  would	  decide	  that	  it	  was	  too	  risky	  to	  offend.	  	  
	   7	  
Early	  writings	  by	  Ronald	  Clarke,	  the	  chief	  architect	  of	  SCP,	  predate	  those	  of	  Jeffrey	  and	  Newman.	  In	  1967	  he	  published	  a	  research	  paper	  on	  absconding	  from	  a	  residential	  school	  for	  juvenile	  delinquents.	  Clarke	  noted	  that	  the	  best	  predictors	  of	  absconding	  were	  aspects	  of	  the	  environment	  –	  hours	  of	  daylight,	  features	  of	  the	  school’s	  regime,	  the	  distance	  home	  –	  and	  not	  any	  individual	  factors	  associated	  with	  the	  absconders.	  At	  this	  point	  Clarke	  provided	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  why	  the	  environment	  was	  so	  important	  or	  how	  it	  interacted	  with	  characteristics	  of	  the	  individual.	  Further	  situationally-­‐focused	  papers	  followed	  (Clarke	  and	  Martin,	  1971;	  Sinclair	  and	  Clarke,	  1973)	  but	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  publication	  of	  Crime	  as	  Opportunity,	  the	  foundational	  Home	  Office	  report	  that	  in	  1976	  marked	  the	  first	  manifesto	  for	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  (Mayhew,	  Clarke,	  Sturman	  and	  Hough,	  1976),	  that	  the	  question	  of	  underpinning	  general	  theories	  arose.	  Crime	  as	  Opportunity	  emphasised	  that	  criminal	  behaviour	  is	  responsive	  to	  situational	  cues.	  Gibbons	  (1971)	  is	  quoted	  approvingly	  in	  it,	  when	  he	  refers	  to	  ‘deviance	  (as)	  a	  temporal	  response	  to	  provocations,	  attractions	  and	  opportunities	  of	  the	  immediate	  situation’	  (Mayhew	  et	  al	  1976:	  1,	  italics	  added).	  A	  subheading	  refers	  to	  ‘situational	  inducements	  to	  criminality’	  (ibid:	  2).	  These	  classes	  of	  cue	  countenance	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  situations	  may	  encourage	  criminality.	  At	  this	  point,	  there	  was	  no	  mention	  of	  ‘choice’.	  Choice	  –	  but	  not	  rational	  choice	  –	  was	  central	  to	  Clarke’s	  1980	  paper	  in	  the	  
British	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  (BJC),	  which	  laid	  the	  first	  systematic	  academic	  foundations	  for	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  theory.	  Indeed,	  one	  of	  the	  headings	  there	  is	  ‘Crime	  as	  the	  Outcome	  of	  Choice’	  (Clarke	  1980:	  161).	  The	  BJC	  paper	  is	  pitched	  against	  common	  sense	  and	  criminological	  dispositional	  theories,	  which	  prevailed	  then	  and	  continue	  to	  thrive	  in	  folk	  thinking	  about	  crime,	  which	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construe	  criminality	  and	  the	  consequential	  criminal	  acts	  as	  the	  product	  of	  some	  more	  or	  less	  aberrant	  or	  pathological	  impulse	  springing	  from	  social	  or	  personal	  factors	  bearing	  on	  the	  offender.	  Against	  this,	  Clarke	  emphasised	  that	  almost	  always	  offenders	  know	  what	  they	  are	  doing	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  there	  is	  at	  least	  an	  element	  of	  choice	  in	  their	  actions.	  He	  noted	  that	  even	  if	  there	  are	  predisposing	  conditions	  these	  are	  hard	  to	  change,	  especially	  in	  the	  short	  term.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  immediate	  and	  manipulable	  conditions	  in	  which	  crime	  commission	  choices	  are	  made	  (even	  if	  those	  choices	  are	  influenced	  by	  social	  or	  personal	  factors),	  however,	  suggests	  a	  practical	  agenda	  for	  preventing	  crime.	  Clarke	  listed	  a	  range	  of	  conditions	  that	  might	  influence	  choices	  to	  offend,	  of	  many	  of	  which,	  he	  conceded,	  the	  offender	  may	  be	  unaware.	  These	  include	  the	  offender’s	  motives,	  mood,	  moral	  judgements,	  criminal	  knowledge	  and	  perceptions	  of	  opportunities,	  assessments	  of	  risk	  and	  likely	  consequences	  of	  offending,	  and	  the	  likelihood	  that	  s/he	  has	  been	  drinking.	  Clarke	  said	  of	  them	  that,	  ‘These	  separate	  components	  of	  subjective	  state	  and	  thought	  processes	  which	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  commit	  a	  crime	  will	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  immediate	  situational	  variables…’	  (Clarke	  1980:	  161).	  Hence,	  in	  1980	  Clarke’s	  articulation	  of	  SCP	  theory	  embraced	  the	  ‘choice’	  element	  of	  RCP	  but	  not	  the	  ‘rational’	  one.	  	  The	  first	  fully-­‐fledged	  exposition	  of	  the	  Rational	  Choice	  Perspective	  as	  we	  now	  know	  it	  came	  in	  a	  paper	  published	  by	  Clarke	  with	  Derek	  Cornish	  five	  years	  later	  (Clarke	  and	  Cornish,	  1985).	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  presented	  a	  detailed	  and	  wide-­‐ranging	  review	  of	  then	  recent	  developments	  in	  the	  sociology,	  criminology,	  economics	  and	  psychology	  of	  crime.	  They	  referred	  to	  the	  sociology	  of	  deviance,	  ecological	  studies	  of	  criminal	  activity,	  criminal	  careers	  research,	  and	  applications	  of	  cognitive	  psychology	  and	  economics	  to	  offender	  decision-­‐making,	  all	  of	  which	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were	  rejecting	  pathological	  explanations	  of	  crime	  and	  emphasising	  the	  need	  to	  understand	  offenders’	  perspectives.	  With	  regard	  to	  accounts	  of	  crime	  that	  stress	  the	  immediate	  environment,	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  counselled	  against	  deterministic	  models	  of	  the	  offender	  as	  a	  passive	  object	  of	  situational	  causes.	  The	  concept	  of	  rational	  choice	  was	  proposed	  as	  a	  way	  of	  drawing	  together	  these	  disparate	  threads	  into	  a	  single	  explanatory	  model	  while	  retaining	  a	  view	  of	  the	  offender	  as	  an	  active	  agent.	  	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  did	  not	  invent	  rational	  choice	  but	  rather	  adapted	  an	  existing	  concept	  to	  suit	  their	  needs.	  The	  roots	  of	  rational	  choice	  models	  of	  crime	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  utilitarian	  deterrence	  models	  of	  Beccaria	  and	  Bentham	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  while	  formal	  rational	  choice	  theories	  were	  already	  built	  into	  classical	  economics	  and	  had	  been	  applied	  in	  psychology	  and	  sociology	  (Becker,	  1957,	  1960;	  Blau,	  1964;	  Coleman,	  1973;	  Homans,	  1961;	  Kahneman	  and	  Tversky,	  1973;	  von	  Neumann	  and	  Morgenstern,	  1942;	  Savage,	  1954;	  Simon,	  1957).	  The	  insight	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  brought	  from	  rational	  choice	  was	  the	  understanding	  that	  much	  of	  the	  information	  about	  the	  likely	  costs	  of	  crime	  was	  located	  in	  the	  immediate	  crime	  setting,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  distant	  machinery	  of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  (the	  focus	  of	  Beccaria	  and	  Bentham).	  In	  later	  writings,	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke	  imply	  that	  their	  decision	  to	  settle	  on	  RCP	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  was	  made	  in	  part	  on	  pragmatic	  grounds	  because	  it	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  more	  palatable	  explanation	  for	  a	  criminological	  audience	  than	  the	  deterministic	  operant	  conditioning	  model,	  with	  which	  it	  shares	  the	  basic	  assumption	  that	  behaviour	  is	  governed	  by	  its	  consequences	  (e.g.,	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2008).	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There	  are	  two	  crucial	  points	  to	  be	  made	  about	  RCP	  as	  proposed	  by	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  –	  points	  far	  too	  often	  overlooked	  by	  subsequent	  critics	  and	  devotees	  alike.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  rational	  choice	  was	  presented	  in	  highly	  qualified	  terms.	  From	  the	  start	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  understood	  that	  rationality	  is	  constrained,	  and	  their	  approach	  owes	  a	  particular	  debt	  to	  Simon’s	  (1957)	  concept	  of	  ‘bounded’	  rationality.	  Simon	  argued	  that	  human	  decision-­‐making	  was	  neither	  perfectly	  rational	  nor	  wholly	  irrational,	  but	  rather	  ‘satisficing’	  –	  satisfactory	  and	  sufficient.	  The	  rational	  decision	  making	  process	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  cognitive	  biases,	  lack	  of	  information,	  time	  pressures,	  emotional	  arousal,	  individual	  values,	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  factors.	  The	  utility	  of	  an	  anticipated	  outcome,	  therefore,	  is	  subjective	  –	  judged	  from	  the	  decision-­‐maker’s	  point	  of	  view	  –	  and	  an	  individual	  may	  not	  always	  pursue	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	  ultimately	  produces	  the	  greatest	  benefits.	  In	  accordance	  with	  this,	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  conceded	  that	  the	  rationality	  of	  rational	  choice	  in	  criminal	  behaviour	  is	  highly	  circumscribed.	  It	  would	  be	  implausible,	  they	  acknowledge,	  to	  suggest	  that	  at	  every	  turn	  offenders	  make	  calculations	  on	  expected	  outcomes	  or	  that	  information	  is	  sought	  and	  obtained	  on	  which	  to	  make	  informed	  calculations	  about	  whether	  to	  offend,	  how	  to	  offend,	  and	  where	  and	  when	  to	  offend.	  	  Second,	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  presented	  RCP	  as	  a	  model	  for	  practice:	  it	  was	  never	  intended	  as	  a	  detailed	  and	  accurate	  description	  of	  how	  offenders	  actually	  make	  decisions	  (see	  Wortley,	  2013).	  Their	  aim	  was	  to	  provide	  a	  simplified	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  situations	  in	  crime	  that	  would	  guide	  research	  and	  policy.	  While	  RCP	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  rational	  choice	  theory	  in	  the	  literature,	  they	  have	  never	  done	  so;	  the	  term	  ‘perspective’	  was	  chosen	  advisedly.	  They	  regarded	  RCP	  as	  a	  heuristic	  for	  synthesising	  existing	  research,	  for	  giving	  direction	  to	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future	  research,	  for	  analysing	  existing	  policy	  and	  for	  finding	  out	  fruitful	  future	  crime	  control	  initiatives.	  In	  other	  words	  it	  served	  to	  stimulate	  the	  research	  program	  for	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  as	  well	  as	  to	  enhance	  practice	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  immediate	  progenitors:	  it	  was	  thus	  conceived	  as	  a	  progressive	  problem-­‐shift.	  	  Repeatedly	  throughout	  their	  1985	  paper	  (and	  consistently	  in	  later	  writings)	  they	  refer	  to	  RCP	  as	  merely	  ‘good	  enough’	  to	  explain	  the	  processes	  of	  criminal	  involvement	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  criminal	  events.	  The	  stripped-­‐down,	  one-­‐dimensional	  depiction	  of	  the	  offender	  –	  ‘bereft	  of	  moral	  scruples’	  and	  ‘without	  any	  deficits	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  self	  control’	  –	  was	  also	  deliberate	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  cluttering	  the	  model	  with	  unnecessary	  detail	  ‘that	  might	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  rational	  action’	  (Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2008,	  p.	  39).	  Moreover,	  they	  explicitly	  invited	  further	  developments	  of	  their	  decision-­‐making	  models	  in	  the	  light	  of	  future	  research.	  Their	  rational	  choice	  models	  were	  ‘tentative’	  (p.	  163),	  ‘still	  at	  a	  relatively	  early	  stage’	  (p.	  163),	  ‘a	  useful	  starting	  point’	  (p.	  178),	  ‘temporary,	  incomplete,	  and	  subject	  to	  continual	  revision’	  (p.	  178),	  and	  to	  be	  ‘modified	  or	  discarded’	  (p.	  149)	  when	  no	  longer	  fit	  for	  purpose	  (Clarke	  and	  Cornish,	  1985).	  	  RCP	  was	  seen	  by	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  in	  the	  mid	  1980s	  as	  good	  enough	  to	  underpin	  both	  research	  and	  practice	  in	  SCP.	  SCP	  had	  always	  been	  conceived	  as	  a	  scientific	  research	  programme	  and	  a	  policy/practice	  programme.	  Rational	  choice	  was	  deemed	  helpful	  to	  both.	  It	  could	  inform	  a	  programme	  of	  research	  better	  to	  understand	  criminal	  behaviour,	  avoiding	  traditional	  and	  dubious	  assumptions	  about	  crime	  as	  a	  product	  of	  special	  pathological	  people	  with	  aberrant	  personalities,	  genes	  or	  social	  backgrounds,	  and	  focusing	  instead	  on	  the	  normality	  of	  crime	  as	  an	  intelligible	  response	  to	  immediate	  cues	  by	  ordinary	  people	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pursuing	  their	  interests	  as	  best	  they	  can.	  It	  could	  inform	  policy	  and	  practice	  by	  steering	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  practical	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  could	  alter	  the	  balance	  of	  advantage	  offered	  for	  criminal	  acts	  in	  the	  specific	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  occurred.	  	  	  	  
THE	  PROBLEMS	  WITH	  RCP	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  by	  now	  that	  RCP	  was	  a	  theoretical	  port	  of	  convenience	  for	  SCP,	  co-­‐opted	  post	  hoc	  for	  pragmatic	  reasons	  –	  a	  building	  block	  for	  a	  progressive	  research	  programme	  and	  policy	  paradigm.	  SCP	  was	  not	  derived	  from	  RCP	  nor	  is	  RCP	  necessary	  for	  it.	  Despite	  this,	  RCP	  and	  SCP	  have	  typically	  come	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  inextricably	  linked.	  For	  devotees	  of	  the	  situational	  perspective,	  RCP	  is	  deemed	  to	  provide	  a	  model	  of	  the	  offender	  that	  explains	  how	  and	  why	  situations	  cause	  crime	  and	  that	  informs	  the	  development	  of	  situational	  strategies	  designed	  to	  inhibit	  criminal	  responses.	  For	  critics	  of	  the	  situational	  perspective,	  RCP	  has	  provided	  a	  convenient	  straw	  man	  to	  be	  knocked	  down	  in	  order	  to	  disparage	  the	  field	  more	  generally:	  SCP	  depends	  upon	  RCP;	  offenders	  aren’t	  rational;	  therefore	  SCP	  is	  invalid.	  	  Until	  recently,	  criticisms	  of	  RCP	  have	  come	  largely	  from	  those	  antipathetic	  to	  the	  situational	  perspective	  challenging	  its	  account	  of	  why	  offenders	  commit	  crime	  –	  those	  who	  would	  ditch	  the	  situational	  paradigm	  entirely.	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  critiques	  of	  RCP	  from	  those	  within	  or	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  situational	  perspective	  (Bouhana,	  2013;	  Ekblom,	  2007;	  Laycock	  and	  Pease,	  2012;	  Nee	  and	  Ward,	  2014;	  Sidebottom	  and	  Tilley,	  forthcoming;	  van	  Gelder,	  Elffers,	  Reynald	  and	  Nagin,	  2014b;	  Wikström	  and	  Treiber,	  2015;	  Wortley,	  1997,	  2001,	  2012,	  2013).	  These	  critiques	  have	  questioned	  not	  just	  the	  adequacy	  of	  RCP	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as	  a	  theoretical	  model	  of	  offending	  behaviour,	  but	  increasingly,	  too,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  provides	  a	  sufficient	  underpinning	  for	  SCP.	  	  These	  critics,	  with	  whom	  we	  identify	  here,	  take	  rational	  choice	  to	  hamper	  the	  broader	  research	  and	  practice	  programme	  of	  SCP	  –	  to	  mark	  a	  degenerating	  problem-­‐shift	  inhibiting	  further	  progress.	  	  	  There	  are	  three	  main	  theoretical	  criticisms	  levelled	  at	  RCP	  –	  that	  human	  decision	  making	  is	  as	  much	  characterised	  by	  cognitive	  errors	  and	  biases	  as	  it	  is	  by	  rationality;	  that	  the	  emphasis	  on	  cognition	  overlooks	  the	  role	  that	  personal	  factors	  such	  as	  emotions	  and	  dispositions	  play	  in	  human	  behaviour;	  and	  that	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  behaviour	  is	  the	  result	  of	  automatic	  cognitions	  that	  occur	  below	  the	  level	  of	  conscious	  awareness	  (see	  Wortley,	  2013).	  	  In	  fact,	  each	  of	  these	  criticisms	  was	  addressed	  by	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  in	  their	  original	  1985	  paper	  where	  they	  were	  at	  pains	  to	  emphasise	  the	  constraints	  on	  human	  rationality.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  show	  that	  offenders	  are	  not	  perfectly	  rational	  (e.g.,	  Hayward,	  2007;	  Katz	  1988;	  Trasler,	  1986),	  but	  then	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  have	  never	  said	  that	  they	  are.	  Likewise,	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  readily	  conceded	  that	  decisions	  made	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  moment	  are	  sub-­‐optimal,	  and	  that	  over	  time	  many	  crimes	  are	  committed	  routinely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ‘standing	  decisions’.	  Thus	  most	  criticisms	  of	  RCP	  can	  be	  effectively	  countered	  by	  labelling	  them	  as	  ‘misconceptions’	  or	  ‘misperceptions’	  and	  simply	  referring	  back	  to	  the	  original,	  highly	  qualified	  description	  of	  the	  model	  (Clarke,	  2005;	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2008).	  	  However,	  relying	  on	  the	  ‘good	  enough’	  ambitions	  of	  RCP	  as	  a	  defence	  presents	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword	  for	  those	  interested	  in	  advancing	  SCP.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  concept	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  provides	  flexibility	  and	  a	  capacity	  to	  accommodate	  anomalies,	  effectively	  inoculating	  RCP	  against	  falsification.	  On	  the	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other	  hand,	  the	  qualification	  that	  rationality	  is	  bounded	  comes	  at	  a	  price	  and	  exposes	  the	  theoretical	  limits	  of	  RCP.	  Each	  concession	  of	  impaired	  rationality	  reduces	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  the	  model.	  For	  example,	  the	  concession	  that	  an	  offender	  under	  high	  levels	  of	  emotional	  arousal	  makes	  less	  rational	  decisions	  than	  an	  offender	  not	  so	  aroused	  can	  be	  easily	  accommodated	  within	  RCP,	  but	  doing	  so	  reduces	  rationality	  to	  a	  partial	  explanation.	  	  Working	  with	  a	  qualified	  model	  of	  rationality	  might	  not	  be	  such	  a	  problem	  if	  there	  were	  also	  an	  active	  research	  programme	  examining	  the	  situational	  conditions	  under	  which	  rationality	  is	  impaired	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  impaired	  rationality	  on	  offenders’	  decisions,	  but	  there	  is	  not.	  Despite	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish’s	  explicit	  invitation	  to	  researchers	  to	  modify	  their	  decision-­‐making	  models	  in	  the	  light	  of	  new	  evidence,	  RCP	  today	  remains	  essentially	  as	  it	  was	  presented	  in	  1985,	  largely	  unaffected	  by	  the	  theoretical	  advances	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  cognitive	  sciences	  (Wortley,	  2013).	  The	  expected	  progressive	  problem-­‐shift	  has	  not	  materialised.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘bounded’	  rationality	  has	  inadvertently	  inhibited	  further	  research	  on	  offender	  decision-­‐making	  by	  providing	  a	  convenient	  escape	  clause.	  The	  factors	  that	  limit	  rationality	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  unfortunate	  ‘noise’,	  interfering	  with,	  but	  not	  completely	  eliminating,	  the	  rational	  choice	  process.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  emotional	  arousal,	  for	  example,	  the	  response	  to	  the	  criticism	  that	  RCP	  does	  not	  account	  for	  so-­‐called	  expressive	  crimes	  typically	  stresses	  the	  vestiges	  of	  rationality	  that	  remain	  even	  in	  highly	  aroused	  offenders	  (e.g.,	  R.	  Felson,	  2005),	  with	  little	  consideration	  given	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  arousal	  affects	  decision	  making	  or	  why	  the	  offender	  may	  be	  so	  aroused	  in	  this	  situation	  (see	  Katz,	  1988).	  In	  Lakatos’s	  terms,	  adherence	  to	  RCP	  in	  such	  cases	  as	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  SCP	  is	  degenerative	  as	  a	  research	  programme.	  The	  non-­‐
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rational	  elements	  are	  treated	  as	  anomalous,	  to	  be	  conceded	  but	  set	  aside,	  as	  Kuhn	  shows	  also	  occurs	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  RCP	  as	  a	  theory	  for	  practice	  is	  similarly	  to	  be	  found	  wanting.	  RCP	  frames	  the	  crime	  prevention	  task	  in	  terms	  of	  opportunity	  reduction.	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  SCP	  strategies	  that	  do	  not	  involve	  plain	  reduction	  in	  opportunity.	  Indeed,	  the	  sequence	  of	  typologies	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  techniques	  that	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  have	  devised	  have	  changed	  in	  significant	  ways	  that	  tacitly	  acknowledge	  the	  limits	  to	  rational	  choice	  without	  explicitly	  recognising	  that	  they	  show	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  supposed	  rational	  choice	  foundations	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention.	  The	  version	  of	  the	  typology	  in	  Clarke’s	  introduction	  to	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  his	  collection,	  Situational	  Crime	  Prevention:	  Successful	  Case	  Studies,	  included	  columns	  headed	  ‘increasing	  the	  effort’,	  ‘increasing	  the	  risks’,	  and	  ‘reducing	  the	  rewards’	  (Clarke	  1992),	  whilst	  the	  equivalent	  columns	  in	  the	  same	  table	  in	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	  second	  edition	  referred	  to	  ‘increased	  perceived	  effort’,	  ‘increased	  perceived	  risks’,	  and	  ‘reducing	  anticipated	  rewards’	  (Clarke,	  1997).	  	  These	  changes	  acknowledge	  the	  subjective	  nature	  of	  the	  judgements	  involved	  in	  offending	  decisions.	  	  The	  second	  edition	  also	  added	  a	  further	  column	  headed	  ‘removing	  excuses’	  (ibid),	  in	  recognition	  that	  ethical	  considerations	  could	  modify	  a	  simple	  cost-­‐benefit	  calculation	  by	  the	  prospective	  offender.	  Later	  still,	  the	  strategy	  ‘reducing	  provocations’	  recognised	  that	  situational	  factors	  can	  precipitate	  crimes	  that	  the	  offender	  may	  not	  have	  otherwise	  contemplated,	  albeit	  that	  in	  that	  version	  of	  the	  table	  of	  techniques	  references	  to	  ‘perceived’	  and	  ‘anticipated’	  in	  relation	  to	  effort,	  risks	  and	  rewards	  are	  no	  longer	  present	  (Cornish	  and	  Clarke	  2003:	  90).	  The	  addition	  of	  excuse-­‐removal	  and	  provocation-­‐reduction	  can	  only	  be	  incorporated	  into	  RCP	  by	  making	  it	  tautologous	  and	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depriving	  it	  of	  its	  distinctive	  analytic	  bite.	  Moreover,	  the	  notion	  of	  provocations	  undermines	  the	  RCP	  notion	  that	  preferences	  are	  consistent.	  	  In	  economics	  too,	  ‘hyperbolic	  discounting’	  (the	  systematic	  tendency	  of	  humans	  to	  switch	  preference	  orders	  as	  the	  moment	  of	  decision-­‐making	  becomes	  imminent)	  undermines	  any	  expectation	  of	  consistent	  intentions	  and	  preferences	  in	  ways	  highly	  relevant	  to	  decisions	  over	  the	  commission	  of	  crimes	  (see	  Elster	  2007:	  111-­‐123).	  	  Homo	  economicus,	  the	  cool,	  though	  fallible,	  calculator	  of	  personal	  utilities,	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  assumed	  adequately	  to	  represent	  the	  potential	  offender,	  who	  instead	  becomes	  subject	  to	  moral	  restraint	  and	  emotional	  drives.	  	  Even	  those	  prevention	  strategies	  that	  do	  involve	  opportunity	  reduction	  do	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  the	  exercise	  of	  rational	  choice.	  In	  many	  cases	  reducing	  opportunity	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  choices	  that	  potential	  offenders	  make	  but	  reduces	  the	  choices	  that	  are	  available	  to	  them	  (Sidebottom	  and	  Tilley,	  forthcoming).	  Taking	  your	  laptop	  with	  you	  when	  you	  park	  your	  car	  rather	  than	  leaving	  it	  on	  the	  back	  seat	  (‘removing	  targets’)	  does	  not	  reduce	  the	  perceived	  rewards	  of	  offending	  in	  any	  meaningful	  cost-­‐benefit	  sense;	  it	  simply	  eliminates	  theft	  of	  your	  laptop	  as	  an	  option.	  The	  invocation	  of	  any	  rational	  choice	  deliberation	  does	  not	  arise.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  offenders	  cannot	  commit	  crime,	  no	  matter	  how	  motivated	  they	  might	  be	  to	  do	  so,	  if	  they	  lack	  the	  necessary	  physical	  or	  personal	  resources	  (Ekblom	  and	  Tilley,	  2000).	  Burglary	  through	  a	  second	  storey	  window	  may	  not	  be	  possible	  if	  there	  is	  no	  ladder	  handy	  (‘controlling	  tools	  and	  weapons’)	  or	  if	  the	  offender	  is	  afraid	  of	  heights.	  There	  are	  countless	  similar	  examples	  where	  what	  matters	  is	  the	  supply	  of	  options,	  rather	  than	  the	  reasons	  for	  exercising	  choice.	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There	  are	  two	  ways	  of	  responding	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  RCP.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  retain	  the	  cognitive	  choice	  framework	  but	  look	  to	  elaborating	  it	  to	  account	  for	  current	  deficiencies.	  In	  other	  words,	  treat	  individual,	  utility-­‐maximising	  rational	  choice	  as	  the	  default,	  but	  create	  a	  more	  nuanced	  version	  of	  the	  offender	  which	  is	  attentive	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  crime-­‐commission	  decisions	  that	  might	  otherwise	  be	  rational	  may	  be	  compromised	  or	  limited	  by	  the	  internal	  cognitive	  limitations	  and	  external	  influences	  already	  alluded	  to	  by	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke.	  This	  would	  preserve	  RCP	  as	  a	  core	  element	  of	  SCP	  and	  try	  to	  sweep	  in	  non-­‐rational	  elements	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  non-­‐rational	  elements	  comprise	  challenging	  ‘puzzles’	  (to	  borrow	  a	  term	  used	  by	  Kuhn	  to	  describe	  ‘normal	  science’	  occurring	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  given	  ‘paradigm’),	  but	  do	  not	  furnish	  grounds	  for	  any	  fundamental	  change.	  	  	  A	  recent	  example	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  edited	  volume	  Affect	  and	  Cognition	  
in	  Criminal	  Decision	  Making	  by	  van	  Gelder,	  Elffers,	  Reynald	  and	  Nagin	  (2014a),	  in	  which	  Clarke	  has	  a	  chapter.	  Contributors	  were	  invited	  to	  draw	  on	  advances	  in	  the	  cognitive	  sciences	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  contemporary,	  complete,	  and	  scientifically	  rigorous	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  offender	  decision-­‐making	  than	  that	  provided	  by	  RCP.	  In	  their	  introductory	  chapter,	  the	  editors	  clearly	  indicate	  that	  they	  have	  no	  intention	  of	  abandoning	  a	  choice	  model	  of	  offending.	  They	  frame	  their	  task	  in	  terms	  of	  giving	  due	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘bounded’	  nature	  of	  rationality,	  which	  has	  been	  neglected	  over	  the	  years.	  “Rather	  than	  referring	  to	  the	  ‘introduction’	  of	  affect	  into	  rational	  choice	  theory	  and	  models	  of	  criminal	  decision	  making”	  they	  write,	  “it	  would	  perhaps	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  refer	  to	  ‘reinstating’	  the	  role	  of	  affect	  in	  criminal	  decision	  theory”	  (van	  Gelder	  et	  al,	  2014b,	  p.	  12).	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The	  second	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  the	  limitations	  of	  RCP	  is	  to	  abandon	  the	  cognitive	  choice	  model	  as	  the	  default	  and	  seek	  a	  fresh	  way	  of	  conceptualising	  the	  role	  of	  situations	  in	  behaviour.	  This	  is	  the	  path	  we	  take	  in	  this	  paper.	  We	  take	  the	  SCP	  programme	  as	  it	  incorporates	  RCP	  to	  be	  degenerating,	  as	  it	  is	  adapted	  to	  accommodate	  non-­‐rational	  aspects	  criminal	  activity	  (and	  inactivity)	  and	  the	  situations	  providing	  for	  these	  non-­‐rational	  drivers.	  Abandoning	  RCP	  as	  the	  primary	  underpinning	  for	  SCP,	  we	  argue,	  will	  open	  the	  door	  to	  new	  directions	  in	  research	  on	  situational	  generators	  of	  crime	  and	  in	  crime	  prevention	  practice.	  We	  conceive	  of	  it	  as	  a	  progressive	  move.	  In	  all	  this	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember,	  as	  we	  have	  been	  at	  pains	  to	  stress	  already,	  that	  the	  situational	  account	  of	  crime	  pre-­‐dated	  the	  incorporation	  of	  RCP,	  that	  there	  have	  been	  alternative	  assumptions	  about	  the	  underlying	  relationship	  between	  situational	  and	  criminal	  activity,	  and	  that	  boundedness	  has	  always	  been	  emphasised	  in	  RCP	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  criminal	  activity.	  Rejecting	  RCP	  is	  very	  different	  from	  rejecting	  SCP.	  	  
WAYS	  OF	  UNDERSTANDING	  THE	  PERSON-­‐SITUATION	  RELATIONSHIP	  	  Ultimately	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  situational	  perspective	  rests	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  immediate	  environments	  play	  a	  non-­‐trivial	  role	  in	  influencing	  behaviour.	  The	  respective	  contribution	  to	  behaviour	  of	  an	  individual’s	  dispositions,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  that	  behaviour	  occurs,	  on	  the	  other,	  has	  been	  a	  long-­‐standing	  point	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  person-­‐situation	  debate	  (Mischel,	  1968).	  The	  issue	  we	  examine	  in	  this	  section	  is	  not	  whether	  crime	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  a	  consequence	  of	  situational	  factors	  –	  something	  that	  we	  take	  to	  be	  axiomatic	  –	  but	  how	  well	  RCP	  accounts	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  these	  situational	  influences.	  To	  do	  this,	  we	  outline	  three	  ways	  in	  which	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the	  person-­‐situation	  debate	  has	  been	  framed	  in	  the	  literature.	  For	  some	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  the	  issue	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  contest	  between	  situational	  and	  dispositional	  accounts	  of	  behaviour:	  either	  one	  or	  the	  other	  plays	  the	  dominant	  role.	  For	  others,	  the	  interest	  lies	  in	  how	  the	  person	  and	  the	  situation	  interact	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  person-­‐situation	  interaction,	  in	  turn,	  has	  two	  interpretations	  (see	  Wortley,	  2012).	  One	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  in	  which	  individuals	  both	  affect,	  and	  are	  affected	  by,	  their	  immediate	  environment.	  The	  other	  is	  that	  behaviour	  is	  the	  combined	  outcome	  of	  situational	  and	  dispositional	  factors.	  We	  argue	  that	  in	  all	  three	  cases	  RCP	  fails	  to	  provide	  a	  full	  account	  of	  the	  role	  of	  situations.	  	  Social	  scientists	  who	  are	  interested	  primarily	  in	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  immediate	  social	  and	  physical	  environment	  on	  behaviour	  hold	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  particular	  situations	  are	  more	  or	  less	  consistent	  across	  a	  given	  group	  or	  population.	  Almost	  everyone	  attending	  a	  funeral	  will	  be	  quiet	  and	  reverential;	  those	  same	  people	  attending	  a	  wedding	  may	  be	  rowdy	  and	  joyous.	  Variations	  in	  behaviour	  are	  caused	  by	  variations	  in	  the	  environment	  rather	  than	  by	  factors	  within	  the	  individual.	  RCP	  emerged	  as	  one	  account	  of	  how	  this	  could	  be	  the	  case.	  The	  probability	  of	  crime	  varies	  by	  situation,	  providing	  those	  within	  it	  prospects	  of	  utilities	  that,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  they	  maximise.	  With	  its	  bare-­‐boned	  depiction	  of	  the	  offender,	  no	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  variations	  among	  individuals.	  Humans	  are	  defined	  by	  a	  single,	  universal	  attribute	  –	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  (boundedly)	  rational	  choices	  –	  that	  provides	  the	  sole	  mediating	  process	  through	  which	  environmental	  contingencies	  are	  assessed	  and	  translated	  in	  to	  action.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  highlighted,	  rational	  decision-­‐making	  has	  severe	  limitations	  as	  a	  mechanism	  for	  capturing	  how	  we	  relate	  to	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  Errors	  in	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reasoning	  are	  ordinarily	  the	  rule	  not	  the	  exception,	  while	  under	  conditions	  of	  emotional	  arousal	  decision-­‐making	  processes	  are	  overwhelmed	  by	  feelings.	  Decision-­‐making	  is	  not	  just	  prone	  to	  error	  but	  in	  many	  cases	  rationality	  may	  not	  even	  play	  a	  meaningful	  role	  in	  behaviour.	  Cognitive	  theorists	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  just	  a	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  the	  neuronal	  activity	  that	  occurs	  within	  our	  skulls.	  A	  great	  deal	  of	  our	  behaviour	  occurs,	  not	  as	  a	  result	  of	  conscious	  deliberation,	  but	  routinely	  and	  reflexively	  as	  the	  result	  of	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  occur	  automatically	  below	  the	  level	  of	  conscious	  awareness.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  more	  to	  human	  behaviour	  than	  decision	  making.	  RCP	  is	  fundamentally	  limited	  by	  the	  restricted	  pallet	  of	  human	  processes	  it	  provides	  to	  account	  for	  the	  impact	  of	  situational	  forces.	  It	  pays	  little	  consideration	  to	  the	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  the	  attributes	  that	  define	  humans	  –	  their	  desires,	  beliefs,	  emotions	  and	  moral	  understandings.	  At	  best,	  then,	  RCP	  can	  provide	  no	  more	  than	  a	  partial	  account	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  immediate	  environment	  on	  the	  offender.	  Only	  the	  offender’s	  instrumental	  cognitions	  come	  into	  play.	  There	  is	  little	  recognition	  of	  the	  power	  of	  situations	  to	  affect	  individuals	  in	  ways	  of	  which	  they	  may	  not	  be	  fully	  aware	  or	  over	  which	  they	  may	  have	  limited	  control.	  Nor	  is	  there	  any	  sense	  in	  RCP	  that	  offenders	  are	  changed	  in	  any	  fundamental	  way	  by	  their	  encounters	  with	  the	  immediate	  environment.	  We	  can	  contrast	  this	  narrow	  rendering	  of	  situational	  effects	  with	  the	  far	  richer	  accounts	  given	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Solomon	  Asch	  (1951),	  for	  example,	  showed	  how	  simple	  expressed	  judgements	  of	  line	  length	  are	  affected	  by	  those	  expressed	  by	  others	  even	  when	  clearly	  contrary	  to	  fact.	  Participants	  not	  only	  offered	  incorrect	  answers	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  social	  censure,	  many	  convinced	  themselves	  that	  their	  incorrect	  response	  was	  correct.	  In	  the	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famous	  Stanford	  prison	  experiment	  (Haney,	  Banks	  and	  Zimbardo,	  1973;	  Zimbardo,	  2007),	  college	  students	  randomly	  allocated	  to	  the	  role	  of	  guards	  in	  a	  mock	  prison	  quickly	  became	  brutal	  and	  authoritarian	  towards	  those	  allocated	  to	  prisoner	  roles.	  The	  situational	  press	  caused	  the	  guards	  to	  lose	  a	  sense	  of	  themselves	  as	  individuals	  as	  they	  submerged	  their	  identities	  within	  the	  group.	  In	  the	  equally	  notorious	  obedience	  to	  authority	  studies	  (Milgram,	  1974),	  the	  authority	  exuded	  by	  the	  experimenter	  induced	  nearly	  two	  thirds	  of	  participants	  to	  deliver	  what	  they	  believed	  to	  be	  life-­‐threatening	  electric	  shocks	  to	  a	  confederate	  participant	  who	  was	  purportedly	  being	  punished	  for	  giving	  incorrect	  answers.	  Participants	  were	  able	  to	  shift	  the	  moral	  culpability	  for	  their	  actions	  onto	  a	  third	  party	  enabling	  them	  to	  engage	  in	  what	  they	  would	  normally	  recognise	  as	  reprehensible	  behaviour.	  Wortley	  (1997;	  2001)	  summarised	  some	  of	  the	  alternative	  mechanisms,	  apart	  from	  rational	  choice,	  through	  which	  situational	  factors	  may	  influence	  behaviour.	  Situations	  can:	  prime	  latent	  thoughts	  and	  emotions;	  elicit	  reflexive	  responses;	  trigger	  habitual	  behaviours;	  stimulate	  sexual	  arousal;	  create	  expectancies	  about	  how	  to	  behave;	  provide	  examples	  to	  emulate;	  pressure	  individuals	  to	  conform;	  pressure	  individuals	  to	  obey;	  prompt	  defiance;	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  anonymity;	  reduce	  the	  capacity	  to	  self-­‐monitor	  one’s	  behaviour;	  obscure	  moral	  rules;	  obscure	  the	  consequence	  of	  actions;	  obscure	  personal	  responsibility	  for	  actions;	  depersonalise	  and	  dehumanise	  victims;	  induce	  frustration;	  generate	  stress	  and	  heightened	  emotion;	  threaten	  status	  and	  esteem;	  and	  provoke	  retaliation.	  The	  person-­‐situation	  interaction	  as	  a	  reciprocal	  process	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  situationalism	  model	  described	  above.	  Again	  there	  is	  generally	  little	  interest	  in	  variations	  among	  individuals.	  However,	  this	  approach	  recognises	  that	  the	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person	  and	  the	  situation	  engage	  in	  a	  bi-­‐directional	  and	  often	  iterative	  exchange.	  Individuals	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  situation	  but	  they	  can	  also	  alter	  those	  situations	  in	  an	  unfolding	  sequence	  of	  responses.	  Person	  A	  bumps	  person	  B	  spilling	  his	  drink;	  person	  B	  verbally	  abuses	  person	  A;	  person	  A	  responds	  in	  kind;	  person	  B	  pushes	  person	  A;	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  bi-­‐directionality	  of	  causation	  emphasises	  the	  agency	  of	  the	  actor.	  The	  individual	  is	  portrayed,	  not	  as	  a	  passive	  pawn	  subject	  to	  capricious	  environmental	  forces,	  but	  as	  an	  active	  and	  purposive	  agent	  capable	  of	  changing	  environments	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  behavioural	  goals.	  The	  iterative	  nature	  of	  the	  person-­‐situation	  interaction	  invites	  us	  to	  consider	  behaviour,	  not	  as	  an	  atomised	  blip	  in	  time	  and	  space,	  but	  in	  molar	  terms	  as	  the	  product	  of	  a	  complex	  series	  of	  inter-­‐related	  events.	  	  	  It	  is	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  reciprocal	  relationship	  that	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke	  have	  in	  more	  recent	  years	  come	  to	  use	  the	  term	  person-­‐situation	  interaction	  to	  describe	  the	  underpinning	  rationale	  for	  RCP	  (e.g.,	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2003,	  2008).	  And	  up	  to	  a	  point	  RCP	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  model.	  The	  immediate	  environment	  affects	  the	  offender’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  opportunity	  structures	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  determines	  how	  he/she	  will	  act	  upon	  the	  environment	  (i.e.,	  by	  committing	  or	  not	  committing	  crime).	  Moreover,	  from	  the	  start	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  have	  emphasised	  the	  purposive,	  goal-­‐directed	  nature	  of	  offending	  (Clarke	  and	  Cornish,	  1985;	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2003,	  2008).	  The	  default	  offender	  is	  the	  anti-­‐social	  predator	  who	  seeks	  out	  and	  creates	  crime	  opportunities	  in	  order	  to	  maximise	  returns	  and	  minimise	  risks.	  The	  portrayal	  of	  behaviour	  as	  an	  iterative	  sequence	  of	  behaviours	  is	  also	  well	  captured	  in	  RCP	  in	  the	  form	  of	  crime	  scripts,	  prototypes	  of	  which	  were	  outlined	  in	  the	  original	  Clarke	  and	  Cornish	  (1985)	  paper	  and	  later	  elaborated	  upon	  by	  Cornish	  (1994).	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Our	  concern	  with	  RCP	  again	  relates	  to	  the	  narrowness	  of	  its	  scope.	  The	  offender	  certainly	  acts	  upon	  the	  environment,	  but,	  as	  we	  have	  previously	  described,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  environment	  on	  the	  offender	  is	  highly	  restricted.	  It	  is	  an	  interaction	  wholly	  on	  the	  offender’s	  terms;	  there	  is	  not	  the	  two-­‐way	  street	  that	  the	  term	  interaction	  implies.	  By	  setting	  the	  antisocial	  predator	  as	  the	  default,	  RCP	  explicitly	  ‘downplays	  any	  independent	  effect	  –	  such	  as	  a	  motivating	  one	  –	  that	  exposure	  to	  setting	  factors	  might	  have	  on	  the	  offender’	  (Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2003,	  p.	  59).	  Offenders	  are	  seen	  arrive	  at	  the	  crime	  scene	  already	  motivated	  to	  commit	  a	  crime	  and	  they	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  environment	  has	  upon	  them.	  The	  situation	  is	  merely	  the	  provider	  of	  data	  that	  potential	  offenders	  may	  accept	  or	  reject,	  a	  process	  that	  remains	  under	  rational	  control.	  Compare	  this	  with	  the	  profound	  psychological	  impact	  demonstrated	  by,	  say,	  the	  Stanford	  prison	  experiment,	  where	  the	  individuals’	  very	  sense	  of	  themselves	  was	  redefined.	  Perversely,	  in	  its	  own	  way	  RCP	  perpetuates	  a	  view	  of	  offenders	  as	  internally	  driven	  by	  static	  criminal	  motivations,	  a	  view	  which	  is	  not	  much	  different	  from	  that	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  familiar	  dispositional	  theories	  of	  crime.	  Finally,	  the	  person-­‐situation	  interaction	  can	  refer	  to	  an	  interdependent	  relationship	  in	  which	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  situation	  on	  behaviour	  depends	  upon	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  particular	  person	  in	  question.	  Put	  another	  way,	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  reciprocal	  interaction	  described	  above	  may	  not	  be	  the	  same	  for	  all	  people	  at	  all	  times.	  In	  this	  conception,	  behaviour	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  person-­‐and-­‐the-­‐situation,	  and	  researchers	  have	  a	  specific	  interest	  in	  the	  role	  of	  individual	  factors.	  Interaction	  is	  used	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  that	  the	  term	  is	  used	  in	  statistics:	  when	  a	  criminally	  disposed	  individual	  enters	  a	  criminogenic	  situation	  the	  combined	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effect	  of	  the	  personal	  and	  situational	  factors	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  their	  individual	  effects.	  	  We	  can	  think	  about	  variations	  in	  offender	  susceptibility	  to	  situations	  in	  two	  ways	  –	  as	  within-­‐	  and	  between-­‐individual	  phenomena.	  With	  within-­‐individual	  variation,	  a	  particular	  individual	  may	  be	  or	  more	  or	  less	  susceptible	  to	  criminogenic	  influences	  from	  one	  time	  to	  another	  depending	  upon	  his/her	  current	  psychological	  functioning.	  Over	  the	  short	  term,	  an	  individual	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  offend	  in	  a	  given	  situation	  if	  they	  are	  depressed,	  for	  example,	  than	  if	  they	  are	  not.	  Over	  a	  longer	  time	  span,	  an	  individual’s	  susceptibility	  to	  crime	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  over	  the	  life	  course,	  following	  the	  age-­‐crime	  curve.	  With	  between-­‐individual	  variation,	  different	  individuals	  are	  liable	  to	  react	  differently	  to	  the	  same	  situation.	  While	  an	  act	  of	  aggression,	  for	  example,	  may	  not	  be	  a	  direct	  expression	  of	  a	  generalised	  aggressive	  disposition,	  a	  person	  with	  aggressive	  personality	  traits	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  easily	  provoked	  to	  violence	  in	  a	  given	  situation	  than	  someone	  without	  these	  traits.	  Likewise	  the	  poor	  and	  needy	  as	  against	  the	  rich	  and	  privileged,	  the	  young	  as	  against	  the	  old,	  and	  men	  as	  against	  women	  enter	  the	  same	  situations	  on	  different	  terms	  and	  are	  liable	  to	  respond	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  RCP	  has	  no	  place	  for	  interdependent	  interactions.	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke	  make	  no	  bones	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  within	  RCP	  the	  offender	  is	  treated	  as	  a	  cypher,	  devoid	  of	  any	  personal	  distinguishing	  qualities	  (Cornish	  and	  Clarke,	  2003,	  2008).	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  gross	  oversimplification,	  a	  fact	  that	  Cornish	  and	  Clarke	  readily	  acknowledge,	  and	  the	  fiction	  is	  maintained	  on	  pragmatic	  (rather	  than	  theoretical)	  grounds.	  It	  is	  obvious	  that	  not	  every	  person	  who	  enters	  a	  criminogenic	  situation	  is	  at	  the	  same	  risk	  of	  offending.	  A	  hundred	  people	  may	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walk	  passed	  an	  open	  window	  before	  someone	  decides	  to	  climb	  through	  and	  commit	  burglary.	  Indeed,	  the	  focus	  in	  RCP	  on	  the	  antisocial	  predator	  as	  the	  default	  offender	  implicitly	  recognises	  this	  fact.	  But	  offenders	  are	  by	  no	  means	  all	  antisocial	  predators.	  Once	  again	  RCP	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  partial	  explanation	  and	  does	  not	  offer	  the	  structural	  capacity	  to	  bridge	  personal	  and	  situational	  contributions	  to	  crime.	  As	  such,	  it	  is	  out	  of	  step	  with	  contemporary	  attempts	  to	  understand	  behaviour	  as	  a	  combined	  consequence	  of	  personal	  and	  situational	  factors	  (Kahle,	  1984;	  Mischel,	  2004;	  Mischel	  and	  Shoda,	  1995:	  Ross	  and	  Nisbett,	  2011),	  a	  research	  direction	  that	  might	  provide	  a	  more	  nuanced	  and	  realistic	  picture	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  offenders	  and	  settings	  of	  their	  crimes.	  	  
TEN	  TENETS	  UNDERPINNING	  SITUATIONAL	  CRIME	  PREVENTION	  Rational	  choice	  was	  only	  ever	  ‘good	  enough’	  for	  some	  explanatory	  purposes.	  Both	  in	  theory	  and	  in	  practice,	  notably	  in	  regard	  to	  crime,	  it	  is	  clearly	  insufficient.	  Any	  adequate	  theory	  needs	  to	  account	  for	  diverse	  ways	  in	  which	  individuals	  and	  situations	  interact	  to	  generate	  patterns,	  and	  for	  crime	  prevention	  what	  matters	  most	  is	  their	  potential	  to	  suggest	  practical	  intervention	  possibilities.	  Moreover	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  unnecessary	  identification	  of	  rational	  choice	  theory	  with	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  has	  led	  many	  to	  assume	  that	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  former	  entail	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  latter.	  This	  is	  a	  mistake,	  but	  remedying	  it	  requires	  some	  reconceptualisation	  of	  the	  theoretical	  foundations	  of	  SCP.	  	  Given	  the	  diversity	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  may	  be	  involved	  in	  processing	  situational	  inputs,	  and	  the	  different	  ways	  that	  the	  person-­‐situation	  relationship	  may	  be	  conceptualised,	  we	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  settle	  on	  a	  single	  theory	  for	  SCP	  that	  will	  satisfy	  everyone.	  	  Instead,	  in	  this	  section	  we	  set	  out	  in	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programmatic	  terms	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  situational	  crime	  prevention	  theory	  –	  propositions	  that	  are	  by	  and	  large	  accepted	  by	  most	  researchers	  in	  the	  field	  and	  that	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  accommodating	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  theoretical	  perspectives,	  including	  RCP.	  They	  are	  intended	  both	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  realistic	  foundation	  for	  research	  on	  situational	  influences	  on	  criminal	  behaviour	  better	  to	  analyse	  problems	  with	  a	  view	  to	  identifying	  potential,	  realistic	  crime	  preventive	  strategies.	  There	  are	  ten	  tenets,	  namely:	  
1. The	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime	  is	  widely	  distributed	  in	  the	  
population	  	  Human	  beings	  have	  the	  capacity	  for	  a	  wide	  repertoire	  of	  behaviour.	  All	  are	  liable	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  have	  been	  defined	  as	  criminal	  and	  almost	  all	  adults	  will	  commit	  some	  criminal	  acts	  at	  some	  time.	  It	  is	  unhelpful	  (and	  inaccurate)	  to	  think	  that	  the	  population	  can	  be	  neatly	  divided	  into	  criminals	  and	  non-­‐criminals.	  	  
2. There	  is	  variation	  in	  the	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime	  across	  
individuals	  	  	  Notwithstanding	  tenet	  1,	  individuals	  differ	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime.	  Some	  individuals	  are	  strongly	  predisposed	  to	  commit	  crime;	  most	  people	  are	  weakly	  predisposed.	  There	  may	  be	  many	  reasons	  that	  individuals	  differ	  in	  their	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime,	  including	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  genetic	  makeup,	  developmental	  influences,	  and	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  world	  in	  which	  they	  are	  enmeshed.	  These	  distal	  causes	  of	  crime	  are	  generally	  beyond	  the	  remit	  of	  situational	  interventions,	  but	  the	  fact	  of	  these	  variations	  among	  individuals	  may	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  SCP.	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3. The	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime	  varies	  over	  time	  for	  the	  same	  
individual	  	  The	  individual	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime	  involves	  both	  relatively	  stable	  characteristics	  and	  more	  transient	  psychological	  states.	  Thus,	  crime	  liability	  is	  not	  constant	  across	  time	  for	  the	  same	  person,	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  stage	  of	  life	  or	  within	  any	  stage	  of	  their	  life.	  The	  age-­‐crime	  curve	  suggests	  that	  the	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime	  peaks	  in	  late	  adolescence.	  Similarly,	  potential	  may	  fluctuate	  across	  smaller	  time	  scales	  such	  that	  there	  may	  be	  spurts	  of	  offending	  interspersed	  with	  periods	  of	  non-­‐offending.	  	  
4. The	  likelihood	  that	  a	  given	  individual	  will	  engage	  in	  crime	  varies	  
across	  situations	  	  Crime	  liability	  is	  not	  constant	  across	  situations	  for	  the	  same	  person.	  Situations	  vary	  widely	  in	  their	  potential	  to	  activate	  (or	  suppress)	  a	  given	  individual’s	  crime	  potential.	  Even	  habitual	  offenders	  do	  not	  commit	  crime	  in	  every	  situation	  they	  encounter	  while	  a	  normally	  law-­‐abiding	  individual	  may	  commit	  an	  occasional	  crime	  under	  certain	  circumstances.	  Crime	  occurs	  when	  an	  individual	  meets	  a	  situation	  that	  activates	  his/her	  liability	  to	  offend.	  
5. The	  relationship	  between	  an	  individual	  and	  the	  situation	  is	  bi-­‐
directional	  and	  iterative	  	  Situations	  affect	  individuals	  but	  individuals	  also	  affect	  situations.	  A	  situation	  may	  activate	  a	  criminal	  liability	  and	  an	  individual	  may	  manipulate	  the	  environment	  to	  maximise	  the	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime.	  A	  particular	  crime	  event	  may	  involve	  an	  iterative	  sequence	  of	  person-­‐situation	  interactions.	  
6. The	  likelihood	  that	  a	  given	  situation	  will	  activate	  a	  criminal	  
response	  varies	  across	  individuals	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Crime	  liability	  is	  not	  constant	  across	  individuals	  in	  the	  same	  situation.	  A	  given	  situation	  may	  activate	  (or	  suppress)	  crime	  liability	  for	  some	  individuals	  but	  not	  for	  others.	  Crime	  is	  a	  function	  of	  individual	  liability	  to	  commit	  crime	  and	  crime-­‐activating	  properties	  of	  the	  situation.	  Crime	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  an	  individual	  strongly	  predisposed	  to	  commit	  crime	  enters	  a	  situation	  with	  strong	  crime-­‐activating	  properties.	  	  
7. Individuals	  enter	  situations	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  readiness	  to	  
commit	  crime	  	  Individuals	  may	  enter	  situations	  with	  formed	  intentions	  to	  commit	  crimes,	  they	  may	  succumb	  to	  temptations	  that	  are	  on	  offer,	  or	  they	  may	  be	  induced	  to	  commit	  crimes	  they	  had	  not	  hitherto	  contemplated.	  These	  states	  of	  readiness	  are	  not	  necessarily	  correlated	  with	  the	  strength	  of	  an	  individual’s	  general	  potential	  to	  commit	  crime.	  For	  example,	  an	  individual	  who	  is	  generally	  predisposed	  to	  commit	  crime	  may	  enter	  a	  situation	  without	  any	  formed	  intention	  to	  offend	  at	  that	  time	  but	  be	  tempted	  or	  induced	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
8. Situations	  affect	  an	  individual	  in	  multiple	  ways	  across	  moral,	  
affective,	  cognitive	  and	  behavioural	  domains	  	  Situations	  may	  activate/deactivate	  moral	  rules	  relating	  to	  a	  particular	  criminal	  act;	  activate/deactivate	  affective	  states	  promoting	  a	  particular	  criminal	  act;	  activate/deactivate	  cognitive	  processes	  –	  including	  perception,	  information	  processing	  and	  decision	  making	  –	  favouring	  criminal	  behaviour;	  activate/deactivate	  behavioural	  responses	  that	  constitute	  a	  criminal	  act.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  any	  given	  situation	  should	  consistently	  activate	  or	  deactivate	  moral	  rules,	  affective	  states,	  cognitive	  processes	  and	  behavioural	  responses	  in	  favour	  of	  or	  against	  a	  criminal	  act.	  	  
	   29	  
9. Individuals	  are	  only	  partially	  aware	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  situations	  
affect	  their	  behaviour	  	  Situations	  can	  influence	  individuals	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  subtle,	  below	  the	  level	  of	  conscious	  awareness,	  and	  outside	  their	  personal	  control.	  Much	  behaviour	  involves	  automatic	  cognitive	  processes,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  mental	  activity	  takes	  place	  below	  the	  level	  of	  conscious	  awareness.	  Individuals	  may	  respond	  to	  situations	  reflexively,	  emotionally,	  or	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  habit	  where	  little	  event-­‐related	  reasoning	  takes	  place.	  	  
10. Situations	  constrain	  what	  particular	  crimes	  an	  individual	  can	  
commit,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  availability	  of	  crime	  opportunities	  and	  the	  
resources	  he/she	  can	  draw	  on	  to	  commit	  crime	  	  Only	  if	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  given	  crime	  exists	  and	  the	  personal	  or	  physical	  resources	  are	  available	  to	  commit	  it	  does	  crime	  become	  an	  option.	  Some	  situations	  may	  exist	  where	  the	  possibility	  of	  crime	  has	  been	  removed	  or	  where	  no	  individual	  has	  the	  resources	  to	  commit	  a	  given	  crime	  however	  much	  they	  might	  like	  to	  do	  so.	  Crime	  opportunities	  and	  resources	  available	  for	  crime	  are	  liable	  to	  change.	  The	  adoption	  of	  these	  ten	  tenets	  sends	  SCP	  in	  a	  different	  direction	  from	  RCP.	  They	  are	  intended	  to	  correct	  what	  are	  increasingly	  deemed	  implausible	  theoretical	  tenets	  for	  SCP	  research	  and	  practice.	  Moreover,	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  assumption	  within	  the	  ten	  tenets	  that	  RCP	  is	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  SCP,	  sidesteps	  a	  commonly	  acknowledged	  weak	  assumption	  that	  has	  led	  to	  a	  widespread	  neglect	  or	  rejection	  of	  SCP	  by	  both	  researchers	  and	  practitioners.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  elimination	  or	  residualisation	  of	  RCP	  as	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  SCP	  opens	  the	  way	  for	  new	  forms	  of	  research	  and	  practice	  that	  tease	  out	  and	  trade	  on	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situational	  measures	  which	  focus	  on	  cues	  that	  lie	  behind	  behaviour,	  which	  do	  not	  operate	  through	  rational	  decision-­‐making	  or	  utility	  maximisation.	  	  	  
CONCLUSION	  We	  have	  argued	  in	  this	  paper	  for	  a	  Lakatosian	  progressive	  problem-­‐shift	  for	  the	  situational	  analysis	  of	  crime	  events	  and	  for	  situational	  crime	  prevention.	  Bolting	  on	  rational	  choice	  was	  intended	  to	  do	  the	  same	  at	  an	  earlier	  period,	  but	  has	  backfired.	  While	  ritually	  invoked	  in	  teaching	  and	  while	  functioning	  as	  an	  Aunt	  Sally	  for	  hostile	  critics,	  it	  has	  lost	  its	  ability	  to	  drive	  a	  research	  agenda	  or	  to	  inform	  thinking	  about	  new	  practical	  ways	  to	  address	  many	  crime	  problems.	  We	  have	  argued,	  therefore,	  that	  it	  has	  now	  become	  a	  fetter.	  Instead	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  in	  line	  with	  much	  other	  research	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  a	  far	  wider	  range	  of	  causal	  mechanisms	  be	  drawn	  on	  in	  theory	  and	  practice.	  	  What	  we	  would	  wish	  to	  retain	  is	  the	  broader	  situational	  approach:	  the	  concern	  with	  crime	  events	  rather	  than	  criminality,	  the	  focus	  on	  near	  causes	  rather	  than	  distant	  (so-­‐called	  ‘root’)	  cases,	  the	  commitment	  to	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  crime	  by	  changing	  near	  causes	  including	  opportunities,	  a	  primary	  pragmatic	  interest	  in	  reducing	  crime	  harms	  in	  the	  short	  as	  well	  as	  long	  term,	  and	  inclusion	  of	  action	  research	  as	  a	  major	  way	  of	  learning	  about	  criminal	  events	  and	  their	  prevention.	  Hence	  this	  is	  not	  advocating	  a	  fundamental	  paradigm	  change.	  Indeed,	  far	  from	  it.	  Situational	  crime	  prevention	  comprises	  a	  relatively	  rare	  example	  on	  the	  social	  sciences	  where	  clear	  cumulation	  in	  theory,	  research	  and	  practice	  can	  be	  discerned	  (Tilley	  2009).	  Our	  intention	  in	  writing	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  help	  ensure	  that	  that	  cumulation	  continues.	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